Comparative Analysis of Russian Hybrid Methods in Ukraine and Syria Crisis

  • Ayhan Yenidünya Gazi University, PhD Student, Kızılay, Ankara and, Turkey
  • Mustafa Atalay Sakarya University, PhD Student, Etimesgut, Ankara and, Turkey
Keywords: Hybrid Warfare, Russian Hybrid Methods, Ukraine Crisis, Syria Crisis.


Hybrid Warfare represents a new and the most effective military strategy in 21th Century. Although it is the most common strategy, it is very difficult to conceptualize. National warfare understandings of each state seem to be the main reason of emerging diversity in hybrid warfare definitions. Russia is one of the states which use hybrid warfare as a military strategy. Ukraine and Syria Crisis are the cases that Russia demonstrate its hybrid warfare understandings effectively. This article mainly explores Russian hybrid warfare capabilities by comparing Russian hybrid methods used in both crises. This article also aims to contribute to the literature of hybrid warfare theories.


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