The Role of Pakistan Against Counter Terrorism

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Abstract

Pakistan joined global efforts to curb terrorism right after 9/11 and kept on playing a vital role as a frontline ally. The country's role in War on Terror was inevitable due to multiple factors such as geography, supply routes and intelligence sharing. Over time, Pakistan carried out numerous operations to dislodge trans-national militants in its tribal areas. After constant terror attacks, it aimed at launching comprehensive operations against terrorists hiding in every nook and corner of the country. Keeping counter-terror policies of Pakistan, the paper is divided into three eras. First, the Musharaf era (2001-2008), in which Pakistan relied on military operations, banned extremist organizations, reformed Madrasahs and drone strikes. Whereas, the second era, under Pakistan People's Party encompasses the overwhelming reliance on Drone Warfare and military operations in Swat and South Waziristan Agency. During the third era, Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif came up with the idea of peace talks with the militants, that went futile and operation Zarb-e-Azab was launched against militants.

Keywords: Afghanistan; National Security Policy; Pakistan; Terrorism; Zarb-e-Azab.

1. Introduction

Terrorism mongering has transformed into a worldwide risk in the contemporary world influencing mankind. Therefore, guiding the states to think of exhaustive counter-fear based oppression technique to address this test, it is an open mystery that the US and Pakistan mushroomed Jihadis during the Cold War and utilized them in Afghanistan against the then USSR [1,2]. The left-over of Afghan Jihad alongside some war masters and nearby enemy of state components were abiding in the inborn belt of Pakistan close to Afghan fringe [1]. The conditions were great and neither the US nor Pakistan had any serious issue with this mushroomed power till 9/11. At last, Pakistan needed to step in as an alliance accomplice in the war against terror.
The geographic vicinity was one key factor that redirected the global network’s consideration towards Pakistan. Islamabad, accordingly, needed to settle on an important choice [2,3]. The choice came about into unusual and erred circumstances, as articulated by numerous researchers that ‘companions transformed into adversaries’. Pakistan’s initiative contrived an approach on the side of the US-drove partnership to remove the Taliban system in Afghanistan. Pakistan got instrumental from multiple points of view for example coordination, airbases and insight sharing [1]. According to call, Pakistan guaranteed the US with "overflight rights, access to Pakistani air, maritime and land bases, the devastation of the household components that were on the side of fear-based oppression against Americans and its partners, end each calculated and strategic help to Taliban”[3]. Though it was an extremely strong choice on part of a nation which was experiencing such huge numbers of difficulties opposite its security, economy and legislative issues and so forth. it was additionally a brilliant open door for Pakistan to reconnect itself with the universal network by offering administrations and land for worldwide activity propelled against terrorists [2]. Consequently, Pakistan turned into the bleeding edge partner in dispensing with Al-Qaeda and its system in Afghanistan and the innate zones of Pakistan. The upsetting and erred some portion of the agreement to join the war on fear was that after the US assault on Afghanistan, numerous aggressors connected with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban moved to inborn territories of Pakistan and got asylum with the neighborhood clans in FATA [3,4]. The US pressure then began mounting on Pakistan which resulted in consecutive tasks in FATA. Thusly, several activists connected with Al-Qaeda and other fear-based oppressor associations were caught and slaughtered by the Pakistani military as a major aspect of the counterrorism tasks. Pakistan must be a signatory to the United Nations Anti-Terrorist Conventions on the control of psychological militant assaults. Simultaneously, Pakistan has likewise marked the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Convention on fighting fear-based oppression. Pakistan has bolstered the goals of the United Nations planned for forestalling worldwide fear-mongering [4]. Pakistan needed to take broad migration control measures to catch and destruct the portability of aggressors situated in and working from Pakistan. By starting clearing measures, the security powers of Pakistan had the option to murder and catch many key pioneers of Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkestan Islamic Movement and Punjabi Taliban [4]. These endeavors reverse discharges and activists did prominent psychological oppressor assaults against non-military personnel and army bases in Pakistan. Resultantly, Pakistan as driving the War on Terror from the front has followed through on gigantic cost for such collaboration, losing a huge number of regular folks and officers just as financial misfortune since 2001. Regardless of the colossal measure of monetary, social and infrastructural misfortune, Pakistan had been the main state during the most recent fourteen years, which was demonstrating its firm purpose and consistency in the war against fear. Keeping this true setting in see, this article would assess Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism Strategy from its initiation [4].

2. Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The advancement of Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy goes back to the period of President Musharaf, directly after the lamentable occurrence of 9/11, when Pakistan was constrained to step forward, with stringent measures to battle against fear-based oppression. [2,3,4]. Not long after the US assault on Afghanistan, the convergence of aggressors connected with the Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Al-Qaeda entered Pakistani inborn zones. Pakistan was left with no other decision however to work against this pack of fear-based
oppressors prepared for non-traditional assaults. To guarantee the writ of the administration, customary armed force was utilized in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the year, 2001[5]. Since 2001, three distinct Governments took charge of the political arena in Pakistan, and diversified counter-terrorism approaches were observed. The primary time began with the Counter-Terrorism strategies of General Musharaf and his political partner Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q). This purpose of time was set apart with 9/11 and propelling of worldwide War on Terror and Pakistan as an accomplice did various military operations against activists covering up in FATA and adjoining regions. Following is an assertive assessment of the Counter-Terrorism-Operations propelled during 2001-2008 [4].

2.1 Counter-Terrorism Strategy under Musharaf

The utilization of power and exchanges are the key instruments while resolving a conflict between different groups. Considering similar scenarios in the past, there are proven facts that different groups prefer the utilization of power according to their inclinations via cautiously looking at the overall circumstances [4,5]. Without profound comprehension about the nearby individuals, culture, notable customs and outcomes of military activities, Musharaf sent soldiers in FATA. At first, such military activities brought blended outcomes and Pakistan relinquished many warriors [3]. In spite of gigantic misfortunes, both in humans and material, Pakistan's military couldn't repress nearby clans. Since the results were not as expected, therefore Pakistan had to review its Counter-Terrorism Strategy and chose to go for dealings. Because of arrangements, the main activity was finished and a harmony understanding was marked between clans, drove by Nek Muhammad and Pakistan Army in 2004 at [6]. Later on, the harmony accord was disrupted by an American automaton strike slaughtering the innate pioneer Nek Muhammad. The US was troubled over this understanding since it accepted the neighborhood clans under Nek Muhammad were occupied with strikes against NATO powers in Afghanistan [4]. Because of the automaton strike, the relations between local people and Pakistani security powers were weakened which eventually transformed into a fight in FATA [7].

2.2 Military Operations during Musharaf Era

After the 'Activity Enduring Freedom' in 2001, several aggressors connected with Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) Taliban, Arabs, and Chechens moved to Pakistan's ancestral territories for asylum [5,6]. This was a disturbing situation for Pakistan. Musharaf requested to dispatch a military activity code-named Al-Mizan against aggressors in innate regions [4]. As a component of Counter Terror Strategy, 'Utilization of Force' would be considered as the essential procedure while working in FATA. The point of the said activity was to track, follow and focus on the aggressors stowing away in South Waziristan Agency. Activity Al-Mizan was propelled under the order of Lieutenant-General Muhammad Safdar Hussain by the Frontier Corps and XI Corps. On March 26, 2003, General Hussain asserted triumph against aggressors, as he said: "We have achieved the crucial was given to us" [3]. Be that as it may, after the passing of Nek Mohammed, BaitullahMehsud rose as the pioneer of the aggressors in South Waziristan Agency [4,5]. After exceptional battling with the BaitullahMehsud congregation, in February 2005, the legislature of Pakistan managed to sustain harmony with BaitullahMehsud at Saratoga [4]. As indicated by the arrangement, the military consented to expel troops from the Mehsud region, remunerate the activists for human and material
misfortunes, and convey Frontier Corps staff to the five strongholds in South Waziristan Agency. Hence by mutual agreement, the control of the territory was essentially given over to the Mehsud clan [6]. Like past understanding, this harmony bargain was additionally brief. In mid-2006, Mehsud started organizing a suicide-besieging effort in Pakistan, which endured until his passing in August 2009. This activity went on for a long time and the Pakistan Army caught several remote aggressors connected with Al-Qaeda, IMU and numerous other transnational gatherings. Al-Qaeda and their offshoots confronted tremendous misfortunes and their order and control structure was genuinely upset [5]. One may expect that it was a strategic triumph for the Pakistan Army because after 2006 aggressors were pulled together and began psychological oppressor exercises against Pakistan. It is striking that Musharaf Counter-Terrorism Strategy was coercive and relied on military tasks [6]. The system didn't focus on advancement, reproduction, restoration or foundation of establishments in FATA after the fruitful military tasks. The weakened financial circumstance and critical circumstances turned into the reasons that aggressors reemerged again in 2007 [5]. In the meantime, a fear monger’s bunch with the name of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) rose as the riskiest gathering in FATA with its underlying foundations in Afghanistan. Alarming, around forty activist gatherings were consolidated under the standard of BaitullahMehsud, and another influx of psychological oppressor assault upset life in the nation. At last, in 2008 the administration was constrained to begin another activity code-named as Zalzala [English: Earthquake] in Spinkai, South Waziristan Agency [6]. It was the first occasion when those over 10,000 armed forces troops effectively took part in the activity and declared a strategic triumph. As per distributed writing, the expressed objectives of the activity were accomplished and aggressors were disturbed yet scattering in other ancestral organizations was unavoidable because of odd conditions. Besides, the TTP earned existence to build up its foundations in other ancestral organizations and unsettled urban zones also [6,7]. This was the point at which the TTP began combining its situation in Karachi, for two significant reasons. Right off the bat, Karachi is the busiest city of Pakistan with over-crowded regions like Manghopir, Sultan Abad, Quaidabad, Orangi Town, Baldia Town, Saeed Abad, Site Area, Banaras Colony, Liyari and so forth. Activists connected with the TTP and other restricted associations moved to these areas as it was simple for them to stow away in these stuffed neighborhoods [5,6]. Besides, the TTP was creating assets from Karachi and enrolling similarly invested individuals for militancy [6]. It has become an open mystery since the TTP connected aggressors were engaged with many bank thefts, hijacking for payoff and blackmail in Karachi; which is something basic among fear mongers to produce illicit assets. General Musharaf’s attention was solely on ancestral zones around then, in this manner, the legislature couldn’t follow the connections among psychological militants and the TTP which eventually prompted the Talibanization of [5]. The administration was not set up to manage this situation which immersed Karachi and there was no solid technique to beat this test. In actuality, the activists were getting a continuous inventory of assets and enlisted people which brought about weakening of security circumstances in FATA [6]. In 2008, security circumstances in Bajaur Agency compounded and the TTP activists supposedly began getting colossal help from their similarly invested gatherings in Afghanistan. Since the situation was observed to be critical, the strategy makers suggested initiating an operation in Bajaur Agency in 2008, code-named as ‘Activity Sher-Dil’ to build up its writ in Bajaur. Around, 8000 Frontier Crops troops upheld by Cobra Helicopters participated in the ‘Activity Sher-Dil’ however the Pakistan Army confronted huge opposition [5,6,7]. In reality, rivals confronted huge mishaps when contrasted with the security powers of Pakistan, according to record, more than 1000 activists were slaughtered [6]. As a piece of methodology, the
direction and control structure of the aggressors was focused on and destroyed. It was expected that the authorities of TTP fled away to Afghanistan. Pakistan military built up new check presents close on the Afghan fringe alongside detailing of neighborhood Lashkars to suppress any cross-outskirts assaults in Bajaur Agency. Without precedent for Pakistan, a large number of individuals were inside dislodged yet after the activity, the administration repatriated Bajaur tribesmen [4]. Back in 2008, another activity was done in Khyber Agency with the codename Daraghalam [Pushto: Here I Come]. A distinctive& coercive strategy was adopted under the military ruler. The activity was planned for verifying key stockpile courses of the NATO powers and destroying the forts of the aggressor authority Mangal Bagh in Khyber Agency [5]. The activity in Khyber Agency assisted the Pakistan Army with opening the stock course of the NATO powers in Afghanistan however no senior authority of the Mangal Bagh bunch was caught or slaughtered. From that point forward Pakistan military has propelled a few airstrikes in deliberately significant Tirah Valley in which numerous aggressors were murdered and their alcoves were crushed. Constant battling between nearby activist gatherings and airstrikes by Pakistan military constrained neighborhood clans to relocate to more secure spots [5,6]. While breaking down the Counter-Terror arrangement one may feature the way that there was a missing connection in the methodology which was "Political Strategy" [6]. Post-operation circumstances were even severed & no political administration could fill the void hence resulting in further pandemonium and disorder. Also, the Pakistan Army was occupied with each inborn organization and no restoration ventures were propelled to expel the feeling of mediocrity from the psyches of tribesmen. In spite of immense misfortunes, the Pakistan government couldn't set up harmony in innate territories. Truth be told activists earned outer help and became more grounded and savage a short time later as the factor of vengeance for killing their administration/sidekicks [7].

2.3 Banning the Militant Organizations in Pakistan

As a major aspect of Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Musharaf prohibited the aggressor associations, which were advancing fanaticism and fear-mongering in Pakistan. Strikingly, this progression was connected to some mounting global weight as the result of the Indian Parliament assault in 2001. In response, India turned unfriendly and expedited more than 800,000 soldiers its outskirts with Pakistan. A military showdown was ringing the chimes for another war including atomic weapons, yet the vow of Musharaf that he would arrange crackdown on aggressor associations killed the circumstance [6,7]. Subsequently, India, at last, pulled back its powers did as well, Pakistan, and a fast-approaching war was forestalled reasonably. It was Musharaf strategy that utilization of power or coercive game-plan could never bring Kashmir back. In this way, he was striking enough to boycott the Jihadi associations and convince India for discussion on Kashmir and other uncertain issues. Because of these choices, Musharaf escaped two targeted assaults [6].

3. The Role of Intelligence Agencies

Intelligence Agencies of Pakistan performed a crucial job in flushing out Al-Qaeda connected activists from the inborn belt and somewhere else. By 2003, the Pakistan Army had the option to catch more than 400 Al-Qaeda activists from FATA and various key pioneers from settled zones of Pakistan. Similarly, the driving force of 9/11, Khalid Sheik Mohammad was held from Rawalpindi in 2003 [7]. His confinement demonstrated productive and dependent on data extricated from him, Pakistan security powers expertly overcame Al-Qaeda’s
arrangements in the country. Musharaf expressed that "We have crushed the spirit of al Qaeda and demolished its vertical and level correspondence joins. We have caught more than 700 fear agents." Furthermore, he said, "I can challenge that no other nation has accomplished more than Pakistan in the counter-dread crusade." It was an uproarious and clear message to the global network that Pakistan's insight organizations assumed the most significant job in the national and universal endeavors for counter psychological oppression, for example, insight imparting to the US and leading joint tasks [7].

3.1 Reformation and Regulation of Madrasahs

It was uncovered during the examinations that a portion of the Madrasahs was in interface with fear-based oppressor associations, supporting-advancing their plan and instilling fanatic musings in blameless personalities. In this way, Musharaf declared suitable measures to control the Madrasah framework in Pakistan. As indicated by records, numerous Madrasahs were utilized as a rearing ground for preparing, enlistment, mentally conditioning and raising money for various aggressor outfits [7]. According to the plan, the strategy of check and equalization on Madrasahs demonstrated as blowback and brought an extreme reaction from strict devotees.

The essential goal of reconstruction and screening of Madrasah's framework was to improve guidelines of strict instruction by presenting imaginative devices and moderate writing, with the goal that it might control developing radicalism and fear-mongering in Pakistan [6]. The enlistment of Madrasah and No Objection Certificate (NOC) was made mandatory for opening another Madrasah. Essentially, the educational plan and prospectus of Madrasahs were looked into and modernized, for example; science and data innovation courses were consolidated, with the goal that under-studies of Madrasahs feel all around associated with different under-studies both in the activity advertise just as in social collaboration. Then again, a couple of nations had reservations that their residents get Islamic instruction in Pakistan and end up being radical [7]. To change this methodology, Pakistan restricted numerous outside understudies. Hypothetically such advances were quite productive for Pakistan yet an enormous number of Madrasahs in Pakistan made it hard for the government to keep viable beware of every single Madrasah. In the contemporary situation, there are a few Madrasahs that are not just giving asylum and enlisted people to aggressor gatherings yet also gathering assets from blackmail and other unlawful methods for the benefit of the activist associations. Along these lines, it was basic for the occupant government to take proper measures to control such Madrasahs with a trans-national system with fear-based oppressor associations [7]. While investigating, it is qualified to refer to that General Musharaf administration was the first to accept exacting activities against Madrasahs as a measure in his Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It may be the way that Musharraf was a Military tyrant that is the reason he was brave and strong enough to take such activities. Had there been any political government, it was close to difficult to think of such a Counter-Terrorism Strategy [7].

3.2 Reliance on Un-manned Aerial Vehicles

The utilization of un-kept an eye on an ethereal vehicle for example Automaton strikes was considered as an instrumental piece of present-day Counter-Terrorism Strategy by the US, in this way, Musharraf permitted constrained automaton strikes inside FATA. During his era, there were 35 automaton strikes and the automatons used to fly from Shamsi airbase to target activists in the innate territories of Pakistan. These strikes brought
inadvertent blow-back and a significant number of Al-Qaeda connected aggressors alongside guiltless individuals were executed. Musharraf accepted that automaton fighting was increasingly prudent and hazard free when contrasted with sending a group of Special Forces. Even though the Drone assaults were counter-beneficial the administration persistently depended on them [6]. This approach was eventually exploded backward and ends up being grievous for Pakistan. In spite of the reality, the US murdered numerous Al-Qaeda, TTP, IMU and ETIM individuals alongside blameless people in Drone strikes. Thus, this counter dread procedure was additionally a disappointment, since executing of a nonentity or a pioneer didn't hamper psychological oppressor exercises of these activist gatherings. On account of TTP, not long after the slaughtering of an officer, the aggressors would supplant him with another and their activist exercises proceed. The irksome component was that with the adjustment in administration, the lethality in demonstrations of psychological oppression was likewise expanded [6].


The Pakistan Peoples' Party's Counter-Terrorism Strategy depended on the 3D approach; Deterrence, Development, and Dialog. It was seen that the PPP government was pressured by the US to dispatch conclusive military tasks against TTP activists in inborn zones particularly in South and North Waziristan Agency. Therefore, the PPP government did two basic tasks in 2009 the Operation Rah-I-Roast was centered around Swat and Malakand districts, while Operation Rah-I-Nijaat was centered around South Waziristan Agency [5]. Then, the PPP government needed to settle issues with serene exchanges. In this way, the administration completed an arrangement with activists in Swat Valley and acknowledged their interest in the implementation of Sharia in the locale concerned [5]. In any case, aggressors in the zone extended their exercises in encompassing zones as well. Resultantly, the Pakistan government was left with just a choice of military activity to clear Swat and Malakand districts. Operation Rah-I-Roast focused on aggressors in Swat, Buner, Lower Dir, and Shangla District. Pakistan Army conveyed more than 30,000 to 45,000 fighters and airborne powers alongside more than 500 men from its Special Services Group [6]. It was a fruitful activity and Pakistan military picked up control territories. Resultantly, the system base of the TTP Swat section was decimated and the rest of the aggressors fled to Afghanistan. Pakistan Army lost around 150 of its warriors though more than 1,475 activists were slaughtered and hundreds were captured. Even though this activity was viewed as a triumph as Pakistan military recuperated the lost ground and cleared the Swat area, yet the primary authority of the TTP Swat part moved to Afghanistan, united their position and did many cross-fringe attacks against Pakistan security powers and regular folks from that point. Around, 2,000,000 individuals were uprooted because of military activity and repatriated effectively a while later [7]. In the interim, the government chose to focus on TTP's solid hold of South Waziristan Agency. At first, Pak-Army cleared a few territories however primary administration of TTP moved to different zones of FATA. Immense stores of arms and ammo were caught and devastated as well. The activity shut every one of the alternatives for aggressors in the South Waziristan Agency [8,9,10]. The TTP had no other choice yet to run forever. Eventually, they got shelter in North Waziristan Agency, from where they refocused/redesigned and began a new rush of fear-based oppressor assaults against Pakistan. It was the disappointment of the PPP government to hand over basic leadership for activities in innate territories to Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. As indicated by previous Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Athar Abbas, on a fundamental level, the
central leadership chose to dispatch activity in 2011 yet because of General Kayani's uncertainty and hesitation deferred this activity for a long time. Pakistan confronted immense financial and human misfortunes during this period. The nonmilitary personnel initiative had no real option except to dispatch activity in North Waziristan Agency [8].

4.1 Counter-Terrorism Strategy during PML (N) Government 2013-2014

The legislature of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) appeared to be more intrigued by chats with aggressors than the utilization of power. Then again, aggressors stayed steady in pursuing deadly dread assaults, so it was accepted that activists had no aim for serene exchange with the government. It is eminent that the TTP has requested that administration discharge their buddies from prisons, authorize Shariah in Pakistan and pull back armed forces from ancestral regions before beginning talks. In this way, these pre-exchange requests were dismissed by the legislature and military, because TTP had assaulted regular citizen and army bases after and during arrangements in the past [7]. At one point, the PML-N believed that the utilization of power would not bring any foreseen outcomes so the State must depend on arrangements with every pugnacious gathering. The authorities set an advisory group to haggle with the TTP yet it went pointless. In the meantime, the Pakistan Army was solicited to set up its line-from activity and not long after the disappointment of conversations with the TTP, it propelled airstrikes followed by ground combative to uncover militancy [5,6,7]. The activity code-named Zarb-e-Azb was propelled in North Waziristan Agency on June 15, 2014; with 25,000 to 30,000 dynamic soldiers. The airstrikes demonstrated profitable as many Uzbek, Al-Qaeda and TTP activists were slaughtered. Pakistan Army verified Miranshah, Boya, Degan, and Mirali towns from aggressors. Shockingly, eleven plants of Improvised-Explosive-Devices (IED) were uncovered in Miranshah in which military recuperated evaluated 23 tons of explosives [6]. Besides, during search activity in Mir Ali Town, the Pakistan Army found gigantic ammo plants. Essentially, Pakistan Army recouped 30 barrels loaded up with explosives and synthetics utilized for making IEDs, underground passages, dungeons, suicide besieging preparing focuses, promulgation material from Miranshah and Mir Ali Towns. As indicated by the DG ISPR, more than 570 aggressors were executed. More than 98 psychological oppressor dens had been annihilated and their correspondence system, direction, and control structure were wrecked [4]. Another significant element of the PML-N's counter dread methodology is the Anti-Terrorism Law which was to reinforce the indicators of the security powers. There was immense shout by the parliamentarians and human rights activists over this new enemy of fear law [3,4]. They were of the view that this law would obstruct the essential thing privileges of the residents. A few people from the resistance seats viewed it as a draconian law [4]. PMLN leader, Nawaz Sharif took a leading position on ramble strikes naming them against universal law, counter-profitable and has delivered no outcomes previously. This may be one reason that there was a smaller number of automatons strikes during this government. The administration's counter fear-mongering technique may be fruitful because regular citizen and military authority were in agreement. The PML-N government chose to proceed with activities in North Waziristan Agency and Karachi. The occupant government and military administration made plans to chase the aggressors crosswise over Pakistan [5,6]. The Pakistan Army rendered immense forfeits in these activities in FATA, since 2001. The Counter-Terrorism Strategy contrived against unpredictable adversaries demonstrated as a missing component in the military tenet of Pakistan. Presently, its powers can battle regular and a guerrilla war with abundant experience of working against trans-national fear-based oppressor associations. The exercises learned in ensuing
activities helped the Pakistan Army gaining the ideal outcomes. At last, it is basic for the regular citizen initiative to fill the hole after activity Zarb-I-Azb for long haul harmony and solidness in FATA [7].

4.1 Drafting a New National Security Policy

In October 2008, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani invested wholeheartedly in pulling together joint goals of Parliament to announce war on fear-mongering after an in-camera session. Be that as it may, no subsequent moves were made to execute the goals’ destinations. Surely, some members of the Islamic gatherings sounded an alternate note in their critique after the goals were passed [6]. General Kayani convinced the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government in 2009 to concede to a significant move against dug in TTP and outside warrior positions inside South Waziristan yet neglected to catch up with comparable activity in North Waziristan, where, among others, the bases of the Afghan Taliban's Haqqani arrange were found [8]. He had amassed power of some forty-thousand in North Waziristan after a fruitful activity against the neighborhood Taliban and different aggressors in Swat and Malakand. Be that as it may, in spite of vows to his U.S. accomplices, he neglected to dispatch an activity there, to a great extent since he wished to get a national agreement and open help for such another crusade. He likewise dreaded opening another front that may broaden profound into the Pakistani heartland [8]. During its five years in power, the alliance drove by the PPP was hesitant to lead the pack in the fight against fear-mongering, conceding to the military. The successor Pakistan Muslims League-Nawaz (PML-N) government stepped toward setting up a national security plan. In the fading a very long time of his residency, General Kayani pushed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to facilitate the formation of a national security strategy. This undertaking was endowed to the PM's close comrade, Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan [7]. The clergyman charged the drafting of an approach and looked to carry the common boss priests into the procedure, yet it is misty on the off chance that he got any substantive contribution from them. On February 26, 2014, he displayed an eleven-page rundown record, the National Internal Security Policy 2014–2018 (NISP), before the National Assembly for banter. As per this report, “Pakistan's inward security condition is ruled by non-customary threats of extremism, sectarianism, psychological oppression, and militancy, no single state organization is fit for managing such dangers all alone” [6]. The NISP spread out the extent of the inner dangers and the strategic goals of the government intend to counter them. Fundamentally, it recorded the requirement for a wide-based way to deal with battling psychological oppression and militancy and displayed thoughts for reinforcing nonmilitary personnel establishments. Be that as it may, it neglected to make the advantageous connection between the military's counterinsurgency tasks and the counterterrorism approach that the regular people were underscoring [5,6]. The NISP named the Ministry of Interior as the lead service for actualizing the strategy and laid out a yearning game plan yet didn't distinguish the assets accessible, nor the dissemination of obligations and duties regarding the NISP among legislative bodies and between the government and commonplace specialists [7]. It additionally stayed away from the issue of instructive change and the need to control and coordinate Islamic theological colleges that were viewed as a potential rearing ground for partisan divisions and fanatic savagery. In interviews for this examination, a senior general said that a paper arranged by the military on a counterterrorism methodology was not reflected in the last NISP. A senior individual from the drafting group of the NISP didn't know about the military's info [8]. By November 2013, General Raheel Sharif (no connection to the head administrator) took charge of the military duties, who squeezed the leader for activity in North Waziristan
following assaults on troops positioned there. The head administrator picked rather connects with the TTP in an exchange; however, these purported harmony talks neglected to get off the ground [8,9]. The postponement in giving the military endorsement to dispatch military activity created some misery among military leadership, and this despondency was amplified across the nation after a shameless assault on Karachi air terminal on June 8 by aggressors related with the TTP. Some twenty-eight people were executed, and the paramilitary Sindh Rangers were called to clear the air terminal. The military had been getting ready for activity in North Waziristan for certain years. The aviation based armed forces had been refreshing its objective records after some time. Seven days after the assault at Karachi air terminal, they have gotten a move on [6]. On June 15, 2014, the military declared a "comprehensive activity against remote and nearby fear mongers" in North Waziristan, Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Albeit military proclamations proposed this was done "on the bearings of the administration," inside records from the military central leadership show that the activity was propelled singularly [7]. Zarb-e-Azb overwhelmed the neighborhood wireless transmissions and paper title texts, bolstered by a high-pitch military data crusade and limited access to data and to the area of the tasks for nearby and remote media. In any case, there were hardly any open doors for the general population to comprehend the subtleties of what was being done and the connection between the activities of the military inside FATA and the moves being made by the regular citizen experts in the remainder of the nation [5,6]. Intermittent gatherings between the common and military pioneers were accounted for quickly, to a great extent through the shorthand tweets from the military PR outfit [6]. Parliament didn't seem to look for, nor was it without a doubt, customary briefings or reports on the continuous tasks. Against this background, it was not surprising that the overall population was not completely occupied with the exertion against militancy and fear-based oppression [7].

4.2 The Emerging Role of NACTA

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is one foundation that may have the option to take on a significant job and help arrange common and military activities against psychological oppression and militancy. After a postponed development, NACTA increased another organizer in August 2015 and begin subsidizing to shape its command [8]. A few assets have been discharged for it to procure staff and set up a no-frills secretariat, however, the 2016 government spending plan distributes just a little extent of the assets mentioned and required. Also, the generally lower pay scales and positions of its individuals may put it off guard to other government organizations, particularly a lot greater, better staffed and prepared offices of the military [5,6]. NACTA likewise keeps on dwelling in the Ministry of Interior, obliging its capacity to arrange crosswise over the government [8]. The present head of NACTA, Ihsan Ghani, a previous Navy official who moved to the police administration and has had a wide scope of experience (counting as examiner general of police and leader of the Intelligence Bureau multiple times in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), has illustrated an extensive and aspiring motivation for move since taking office in August 2015. He has been assigned a thirty-five-man staff and a board that should meet quarterly, however the board had not met until late 2015 when Mr. Ghani was met for this examination [9]. NACTA has a Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) segment that is imagined to be 800 men solid once it is completely staffed. In any case, the JID will be fundamentally in military hands, and NACTA itself will have just 300 staff at greatest [7]. The military is unwilling to working under the Interior Ministry and would want to work with the executive's office. However, most benefactors, including the United States and the United Kingdom, appear to support a non-military personnel face of NACTA and are attempting to coordinate
assets toward it [8]. Ghani considers NACTA's to give security cautions, yet additionally to direct research and specialty approaches, and to accumulate support for police work among people in general by successful utilization of the media [6,7]. NACTA plans to build up further connections with nearby and universal research organizations taking a shot at counterterrorism, countering fierce fanaticism, de-radicalization, compromise, and adjustment [7]. A key component in his de-radicalization endeavors is the production of a solid base of cops with sound scholastic and field experience. At the highest priority on his rundown of twelve things is theological college change, given the profound underlying foundations of sectarianism, militancy, and fear-mongering in the instructive arrangement of Pakistan and the expanding job of strict schools [9]. The accomplishment of NACTA will depend not just on the nature of its initiative and staff, be that as it may, maybe more significantly, on the arrangement of budgetary and political help. This help is required if NACTA is to turn into a functioning member in the execution of the NAP, just as an immediate asset for the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS)— which in principle is the focal body to audit Pakistan's security issues, household and outside [10]. Be that as it may, the CCNS has not been meeting normally, nor does it, or the National Security Advisor, routinely interface with NACTA. In spite of its deficiencies, the NISP was a significant advance forward to lay out the difficulties facing Pakistan and recognize the assignments ahead. If appropriately bantered in common society fora, and if the consequences of those trades had been combined, the NISP could well have laid the reason for a significant move in broad daylight comprehension of and continued help for this significant activity [8]. In any case, the key organization entrusted with planning a significant part of crafted by the NISP, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), was not yet completely operational starting at mid-2016 (over a year after the dispatch of the NAP), and there was no distinctive organizer inside the focal government for the media and open strategy discussion which was important to request any help. ACTA's job in the NAP stayed aloof and negligible [10].

5. Provincial Apex Committees

A key starting component of the NAP execution plan was the development of impromptu bodies at the commonplace level, uniting military and regular citizen pioneers. The "Peak Committee" design was utilized during the Musharraf government to unite the corps officer and the commonplace political administration in Peshawar to talk about issues identified with security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (prior known as the Northwest Frontier Province) and FATA [6]. Its recovery offered a chance to unite the central ministers and their senior authorities in every commonplace capital with the military corps administrator and his senior authorities, just as the Directors General Rangers of Sindh and Punjab and the Inspectors General of the Frontier Corps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, where pertinent [6,7]. On uncommon events, the senator or other driving lawmakers were welcome to gatherings. The military in charge and the executive general of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (DG ISI) took an interest in certain gatherings when the central pastors were additionally present [9]. However, the interior minister and heads of NACTA and the Intelligence Bureau were not regulars in those commonplace considerations; nor was the priest of safeguard, nor even the new National Security Council. In August 2016, the national security guide was entrusted by the leader with an audit of the NAP; in any case, he doesn't have the staff or assets nor the line position to screen or shape activities in the areas [5]. The inside priest promptly explained in the national get together that the national security consultant's work was just "regulatory," alluding to the fifteen boards that the head administrator had set up to screen the
NAP [7]. No subtleties of the dispatches of those boards were given. There was no framework for steady and customary answering to general society on the plan and outcomes of the Apex gatherings. At the national level, a couple of points are raised over and over, however, absent a lot of continuum in the investigation [5,6]. Among these is the solicitation from the military to enact the exceptional courts under the Protection of Pakistan Act and for lawmakers to lead the pack in moving against theological schools, detest discourse, and strict researchers have known for inducing sectarianism [4,5]. The interior & finance ministers were approached to audit existing laws identified with closure psychological oppression financing and propose methods for improving them [8]. At the commonplace level, the nature, tone, and substance of the talk’s changes generally, contingent upon the issues at the front line in every region. The site of the gatherings additionally changes. Some are held at military central command, others at the main priest's workplaces. There is minimal direct coordination of these gatherings' motivation with the reported reasons for the NAP [6,7].

5.1 PUNJAB

The main gathering of the Punjab Apex Committee occurred at the corps base camp in Lahore Cantonment and incorporated the military boss, DG ISI, corps leaders from crosswise over Punjab, and the Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif. This significant level dialog concentrated on the inner security circumstance [4,5]. The central priest underlined the requirement for an exhaustive security plan that could be mutually executed by the common group and the military [9]. It was not clear who might lead the pack; however, the military in charge guaranteed the main priest of the military's help. After some time, the center moved to changing educational plans and on theological colleges. Explicit activities to limit the monetary exercises and raising support of restricted associations and a crackdown on psychological oppressors and their facilitators and lenders went to the fore in resulting gatherings. Once more, no subtleties were imparted to the general society. Between January 2015 and November 2015, nearly seven gatherings of the Apex Committee were supposedly held in Punjab [9]. No unmistakable activities have yet developed against the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, or other radical associations that were once observed as intermediaries of the state against India in Kashmir. The military boss is accounted for revealing the confidential information that activities will continue against all groups and that "we will go where the proof takes us" [6]. But other than a restricted activity against a solitary gathering of gangsters drove by a man named Chottu in Punjab under an activity initiated by the Lahore corps leader and named Zarb-e-Ahan, there has been no deliberate military push to seek after its expressed goals. The past corps officer likewise supported the probability of military activity in Punjab "as and when the opportunity arrives." According to him, a rundown of somewhere in the range of eleven hundred potential suspects was assembled in discussions between Inter-Services Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the police's counterterrorism division. A significant number of the key suspects were at that point in correctional facilities; the corps administrators showed that inside two months, 700 had been caught [10]. The military was additionally worried about the mushrooming of madrassahs in the territory and continued to distinguish through "geotagging" exactly fourteen thousand. "At last, we went in for 500 madaris," the corps leader said. The military boss participated in a gathering of the head administrator with religious pioneers in Islamabad to underscore the significance of holding the madaris within proper limits. "We'd instruct them to begin at the top," said the corps officer, while conceding that the "limit of the Punjab specialists was restricted"[8].
5.2 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA

The debut meeting of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Apex Committee occurred on January 4, 2015, and incorporated the military boss, the DG ISI, the corps officer of Peshawar, the legislative leader of KP, and the Chief Minister Pervez Khattak. The talk concentrated on KP and FATA, the progress of Zarb-e-Azb, activities in Khyber Agency of FATA, and the circumstance of the uprooted people because of military tasks. Brief reports on each of the nine gatherings of the Apex Committee between January 2015 and February 2016 showed up in nearby media [11]. Late in January 2016, the center moved to the security of instructive organizations following the assault on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda. IBOs likewise figured in these later gatherings. Resettlement stayed a significant plan thing in February 2016. The military was quick to set up an improved organization to deal with the necessities of the individuals; there seemed, by all accounts, to be an accord that the FATA change process was moderate [8]. This occurred against the scenery of a report from the FATA Reforms Commission with suggestions regarding the future status of FATA. The leader set up another advisory group, headed by his Advisor on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz, to audit the proposals and recommend activities. There was no open dialog or investigating progress on this front until July 2016 [11]. No unmistakable portrayal from FATA, in either the changes commission or the ensuing board of trustees, demonstrated that an ultimate conclusion would be taken in Islamabad without confirmation by the individuals of FATA. This is the thing that at last happened as another report was delivered and discharged in June 2016 that recommended a merger of certain pieces of FATA into KP in a progressive procedure along these lines extending the size of KP as opposed to making another region that may have profited by centered consideration regarding its exceptional needs and given the individuals of FATA more noteworthy state in their future [11].

5.3 Balochistan

The primary gathering of the Balochistan Apex Committee occurred in Quetta on January 9, 2015, and was led by the Chief Minister Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, helped by the home minister, the central secretary, the controller general of police, and the home secretary. Leader of Southern Command, Lt. Gen. Nasser Khan Janjua and the overseer general of the Frontier Corps (Balochistan) additionally took an interest. (General Janjua later resigned and was drafted into the focal government as national security council yet stopped to partake in gatherings on the NAP.) According to distributed reports, the gathering concentrated on cases to be sent to military courts, and an understanding was set up to work with ministers to kill detest discourse and writing. It was additionally concluded that the advisory group would meet at regular intervals; in any case, as indicated by the general population record, just six gatherings occurred until February 2016 [8]. The military activities are generally at the "unmistakable and hold" stages. "Fabricate and move" are not yet done in any substantive way, however, some remaking action under the military’s aegis had begun in South Waziristan Agency with the U.S. what's more, Arab reserves and in Miran Shah in NWA. A street arrange has been made in NWA that fills a key need for military activities yet additionally vows to aid the financial recovery of the office [10]. The essential goal of the military presence is a four-staged activity to bring back the temporarily uprooted people (TDPs); to promptly restore mosques, streets, schools, power, water, and animals; and to bring back instructors [8]. As indicated by the corps officer, stage one for the arrival of TDPs has been finished. Streets have been constructed and power reestablished, including the establishment of sun-based hardware to help with tube wells and funneled water
The military-led the pack, since, as per the leader, the FATA Secretariat didn’t have the limit. On the military side of the operations in FATA, Lt. Gen. Hidayatur Rehman revealed that the outskirt had been shut to the entrance from Afghanistan in the region connecting NWA [9]. In the Tirah region, as well, and the more extensive Khyber Agency, progressive tasks have cleared the activists of the Lashkar-e-Islam, encouraging travel to and from Peshawar in one hour rather than six. As indicated by him, more than 2,000 IBOs had been directed related to the police in KP by the last 50% of 2015 [8].

5.4 Sindh

The Sindh Apex Committee was run by the prime minister and was contained thirteen individuals including, the commonplace pastors for data and parliamentary undertakings, the corps authority, General secretary, Director General Rangers, the auditor general of police, divisional official, part officer of the Inter-Services Intelligence, and joint executive general of the Intelligence Bureau of Sindh [9,10]. It held its first gathering on January 8, 2015, and was advised, in addition to other things, on the instances of strict and partisan fear-mongering. The Sindh government consented to reinforce enactment on detest discourse and radical material, utilization of amplifiers and checking of printers and publishers and SMS (short message administration, or instant messages on cell phones), sites, and online life [7]. The central pastor additionally requested that all divisions recommend cases to be sent to the military courts for speedy taking care of and to get serious about illicit workers and Afghan displaced people who had looked for cover in Sindh. Some sixty-four fear-based oppression cases were in this way sent to military courts [11]. Later gatherings concentrated on building up an antiterrorism power inside the police and a counterterrorism officer. Yet, the military kept on having worries about the idea of the police nominees, and at one gathering, the military boss requested the depoliticizing of these arrangements by having the Apex Committee support postings [6]. The panel likewise chose to dispatch an exhaustive activity to end fear-mongering financing systems, and the military boss affirmed the setting up of a counterterrorism office at V Corps central station with a knowledge-sharing cell. The corps officer likewise recommended the requirement for computerization of records of theological colleges and land records. Later gatherings wept over the moderate advancement in actualizing a significant number of the prior choices of the Apex Committee and particularly on the low conviction paces of crooks [9]. The board of trustees was informed that moderate advancement in Sindh was hampering the national exertion. An issue much of the time emerging was the moving order of the Rangers in the help of common force. They must be ordered for ninety days one after another, and the Sindh government had worries about their activities, which encompassed political agents of the decision PPP [10].

6. Conclusions and Recommendation

It is proposed that Counter-Terrorism Strategy would be inadequate without post-war reproduction, recovery, limit building, business and strengthening of the nearby clans. It is the reality that jobless and denied networks are powerless against the fear-based oppressor associations, who can abuse them effectively against the legislature. In this manner, the political government should define an extensive line of activity to address these hazy areas which once have profited the psychological militants. Finally, inborn zones ought to be coordinated with the standard of the nation and instructive framework must be guaranteed by the assistance of legislative and
nongovernmental associations. The military declared Zarb-e-Azb to be ended on the right note. As indicated by the Peshawar Corps commander, "Security powers have a nearness in 99.2 percent of regions inside FATA," with just a little region flanking Afghanistan vacant. The military is currently propelling supposed "examining" tasks (insight-based ranges) in-country and urban KP to dispose of sleeper cells and systems. Zarb-e-Azb has dislodged the psychological oppressor arranges in FATA and decimated their preparation and supply focuses, however the authority got away to Afghanistan. The fear monger and activist partisan systems inside Pakistan appropriate presently can't seem to be disassembled and incapacitated, particularly in Punjab. Pakistan has made the first strides in quite a while war inside; how well this clash of Pakistan continues will decide whether this will be a quick triumph or a since a long time ago, drawn-out battle with an unsure consummation. The legislature ought to be recognized for thinking of both the NISP and the NAP, which fill in as significant strides toward a national discussion on household security dangers, and to counter the account of the aggressor gatherings. In any case, the methodology needs to cover other key components, for instance, training change, that could present difficulties in accomplishing its planned destinations. Building up more keen terms of reference for the NAP, even at this stage, could assist spell with excursion all the more the relationship of the regular citizen and military entertainers during the time spent formulating and actualizing this methodology. The executive ought to likewise request intermittent advancement reports and assign the priest of inside to liaise with the territories and other key elements, including the military, keeping that in mind. These reports ought to be imparted to parliament for dialog all the time and later with people in general. The procedure ought to explain the administration's situation on not just the proceeded with the activity of armed forces inside Pakistan yet additionally the free and frequently extra-lawful tasks of its organizations. This would create bigger responsibility and help set up an open trust in this exertion and the administration's aims. The organization of paramilitary powers for a delayed period in urban settings could get counterproductive. Ongoing recordings posted by the MQM's online life groups show Rangers' troopers and noncommissioned officials beating regular folks out in the open in Karachi, activities that have been performed up till now were related to the un-prepared neighborhood police powers. Such counter-propaganda by political powers will make the military's activity troublesome. Better preparation of examiners could help the military in taking cases to their legitimate decision. This is the most vulnerable connection in the common military nexus. Cases self-destruct when poor police work and indictment prompt expulsion of cases in common courts. There must be a clear direction and support of key components of the state in the NAP's consultations, including explicit jobs for the Ministry of Interior and NACTA, the Intelligence Bureau, the Ministry of Defense, and commonplace police offices. Proportionate assets ought to be distributed to these undertakings; for instance, satisfactory police powers in Karachi and other key areas. Further clarity is required on the nature and stream of assets that will be given from the middle to the territories, which bear the heaviest load of execution of the NAP's targets.

References


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