

Nonviolent Approach: Alternative to Military Strategy for Curbing Terrorism in Nigeria

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Abstract

Factors such as poor governance, fierce passion for the Islamisation of Nigeria and other grievances that are difficult to resolve through political process breed terrorism. Government should first correct the known ills in her governance. Government's first attempt on curbing terrorism was the use of force, which is so defective. The just war theory, stipulate that, military action shouldn't cause terror and dead of civilians, which the army is seriously accused of. The first wrong step by the government agency was the extra judicial killing of Boko Haram leader, which exacerbate the violence and increase sympathizers to the sect advantage. The first step should have been intelligence gathering and study how to defeat the sect if not, then, a holistic approach that encapsulates all the actors (Government, the citizens and the NGOs) not a selected few in the fight against terrorism. The paper used qualitative methodology and the method of data collection were from semi-structured interviews, books, media and internets sources. The theory used is "Just War Theory". The evidence presented in this paper is that some of the many stakeholders are not active in the fight against terrorism. A consistent, nonviolent approach and good governance could have controlled the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. However, a concerted de-radicalization program that forestall the possibility of recruitment and the process of de-radicalizing those radicalized is nonviolent approach.

Keywords: deprivation; Boko; Haram; Just war; Islamization; Terrorism.

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1. Introduction

Rumblings about an impending and major Islamization of Nigeria has been suspected at an earlier time during the regime of Muritala Mohammed in 1976 and in recent times at the beginning of the Obasanjo presidency in 1999, when all the states of the federation to the “far” north had found themselves compelled to introduce and implement a Sharia-based system of law and administration within their respective jurisdictions. Since then, there have been indications that northern Nigeria is gradually moving away from the center. So, when the Boko Haram sect came up with a stricter form of Islamic fundamentalism culminating into a terrorist organization, it was not much of a surprise to intellectual observers. The biggest terrorist threat which Nigeria is facing today is from *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad’, nicknamed *Boko Haram* (Western education is forbidden or sacrilege). It is a Salafist jihadist terrorist organization based in the northeast of Nigeria. Boko Haram is an Islamist movement founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, with the sole aim of abolishing the secular system of government and establishing a Sharia system in the country as they strongly oppose man-made laws. The group was first known internationally after a sectarian violence in Nigeria in the year 2009, when its fighters frequently clashed with Nigeria's central government. Since 2011, the group has been responsible for thousands of killings in Nigeria, it is difficult to determine a clear structure or evident chain of command. However, report has it that Boko Haram the radical Islamist group, based in northern Nigeria that once specialized in robbing banks and attacking defenseless Christian congregations has transformed into a terrorist organization as its gunmen have become suicide bombers [1]. This is partly due to the help it received from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a branch of the international terrorist network based in the Saharan states of Mali, Niger and Algeria. This was evident from their choice of weapons which included car bombs and caches of "improvised explosive devices", with detonators and shrapnel packed into soft drinks cans. The mayhem caused by Boko Haram attacks has reached such a level as to cause one of the online blogs (<http://factsnigeriaviolence.org>) to keep record of the violent attacks on Nigeria. The summary of major attacks carried out by the group from July 2009 to December 2014 appear on Table 1.

2. Government Response

The scholar in [2] records that the Nigerian government’s response to Boko Haram is primarily a show of force. There are routine police searches, Nigeria’s military forces have been deployed on multiple occasions to find and apprehend members of the group, search and seize weapons used by the terrorists, enforce curfews, and other counterterrorism missions. However, it can be said that Nigeria’s leaders are learning that successfully confronting the threat of Boko Haram will require more than a traditional kill/capture counterterrorism strategy. He further recorded that the Governor of Borno State “admitted that the army has been guilty of excesses during operations to counter Boko Haram.” [2]. According to BBC News, on 12 July 2011, a group of 18 local members of the respected Borno Elders Forum called for the withdrawal of troops from the city, saying the soldiers had worsened the security situation, and negatively affected the relationship between Nigeria’s security forces and the community members they are ostensibly there to protect. It is to be emphasized that government response to the threats posed by the Boko Haram sect are largely military in nature, and this could be based on several possible reasons. Examining the extant Nigeria’s intervention strategy for terrorism prevention and

management, will reveal the use of force for force, which is due to the diagnosis which sees terrorism as first and foremost a military problem, which must be matched with military force.

Table 1: Summary of Timeline of Major Terrorist Attacks/ Incidents in Nigeria from 2009 to 2014.

Year	Number of Targets Attacked (Govt./ Western Institutions)	Number of Targets Attacked (Civilian Population)	Number of Targets Attacked (Religious/Christianity)	Number of Methods/ Means of Attack (Armed Attack)	Number of Method / Means of Attack (Bombing)	Total Number of Casualties
2009	05	01 (800)	-	05	-	100+
2010	04	02	01	02	03	129
2011	06	05	03	04	10	301
2012	07	04	10	09	09	651
2013	07	16	01	18	06	991
2014	01	34	3	28	9	2447
Total	30	56	18	66	37	4619+

Counter terrorism programs in Nigeria are majorly military oriented, which make scholars wonder if that is the only approach that can work. Until recently, the attack and defend approach is only leading to the increased number of suicide bombers. The intervention strategy adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria, started with the JTF Operation Restore Order 1, and progressed to the Declaration of State of Emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States is the focus or problem of this study. Another possible reason why the military dominated strategy might be in play is because the government is attempting to save face and demonstrate that funds allocated to it are in use because huge investments have been given to defense budget over many years. According to the former Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, President Jonathan signed Nigeria's 2014 budget of N4.962 trillion and Defence got N968.127 billion representing 20% of the total budget because of the growing insecurity situation in the country. One may also point to the intensity of the conflict situation, which can be seen in the sophistication of arms used by the members of the group, increasing geographical spread of the conflict, rising number of casualties and number of persons drawn into conflict on both sides. It must be said that from 75 deaths on both sides in 2010, 154 persons in 2011, 454 in 2012, the number of deaths on both sides in 2013 have exploded to a shocking sum of 1638 deaths in the first half of the year alone! [4]. According to Egbue and colleagues in [5] using conflict suppression instruments of (police, army, local vigilante, taskforce, thugs etc) to quell or push issues precipitating conflict under the carpet, do not lead to solutions that are sustainable and shared by other parties involved, therefore, less useful in fighting terrorism. However, Ruby and his colleagues, 2002 identified two occasions where and when force can be relevant. They said the first situation is at the initial stages of peacekeeping where force helps to achieve or allows for a cooling off period to occur before the start of the rest of strategic conflict resolution processes. The second situation is

during the implementation of peace-enforcement processes. Above all, the laws of armed conflicts must be strictly adhered to and the timeframe for military action must not be protracted to reduce casualties (especially on the part of terrorist group) which might negatively affect their interest for peace talks.

3. Theoretical Framework: Just War Theory

The theory explains the choice for military counter-terrorism strategy. Just War Theory is a doctrine derived from the work of Bishop Augustine of Hippo after the collapse of the Roman Empire that provides criteria for the decision to go to war (*jus ad bellum*) and guidelines for conducting war (*jus in bello*). This theory over the centuries has led to the development of several principles that have greatly influenced Western political thought and international law particularly. The five principles of Just War Theory are: (1) that the war be a last resort, and countries and government must not enter into it until all other means of resolution have been explored and found wanting; (2) that the decision to engage in war be made by a legitimate, duly constituted authority, and not by aggrieved individuals; (3) that there be right intention and just cause, as neither aggression nor revenge are acceptable reasons because the detrimental results of war should not outweigh the intended injustices targeted for amelioration; (4) that success be reasonably attainable, without much cost; and (5) and finally, the result of the envisioned peace be preferable to the situation that would pertain if the war were not fought. Even though the first criteria for military intervention by the theory is that war be a last resort, and countries and government must not enter into it until all other means of resolution have been explored and found wanting; the Nigerian government first intervention into the Boko Haram insurgency is military attacks which led to the deaths of many members of the sect and civilian population.

4. Call for Change of Strategy

The author in [2] further argued that the government must know that inequitable application of the rule of law exacerbates an already deeply problematic system of ethnic identity politics, which detracts from any significant sense of national unity or shared journey. Also, the government must also address the myriad socioeconomic demands like poverty, health and educational services, unemployment, infrastructure, and so forth, because there is a link between these many kinds of grievances and the rise of violent extremism is particularly prominent in the north, where the people have higher poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, health problems, and overall insecurity than elsewhere in Nigeria. What is interesting with this line of thought is that this view that proposes beyond military force as a strategy for security was highlighted in the September 2011 report by the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone, which noted the need to address issues of governance and the delivery of services to people. At the international environment, Nigeria must collaborate with others to combat regional and global trafficking networks that could be used to help finance terrorist groups in their country, as captured in the Congressional testimony of Jennifer Cooke, Director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in which she says:

The Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram will need to be integrated into a comprehensive political, economic, and security strategy that offers some promise of real improvement to northern populations and communities and limits the appeal of Boko Haram and its potential successors [2].

Forest also argued that a whole-of-government approach is necessary for successfully defeating a terrorist group, and for that of Boko Haram, a “whole of Nigeria approach” in which government forces and nongovernmental entities are engaged in a complementary effort, in some cases with the support and assistance of the U.S. and the international community. In his book, the role for successful navigation of violent conflict or terrorism has multiple layers. This would include the role Government because there are things which only the Government has the power to implement them. The second group is the role of individual citizens and finally the role of the NGOs and private institutions. Forest further justifies this that success will come only from working together to understand all we can about Boko Haram and the environment that has sustained them, and then craft a strategy that employs this knowledge to maximum benefit. So,

...Boko Haram is an enemy of moderation and stability; they have chosen to promote a violent ideology shrouded in religious language, and portray themselves as a vanguard of an epic struggle between good and evil. As such, they cannot be bombed into submission, nor can all Boko Haram members and sympathizers be identified and captured or killed. Just like many other religious terrorist groups around the world, the eventual demise of Boko Haram will come through a combination of kinetic force, law enforcement, local intelligence, and diminishing the local resonance of the group's ideology [2].

5. Government Soft Approach

However this is not to say that the response of the Nigerian government is purely military as it has non-military plans enshrined in the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) based on the following overriding five principles of Effectiveness, Proportion, Transparency, Flexibility, and Collaboration. The planned response to terrorist threats are based on the five Ps – **P**revention of terrorist attacks, **P**rotection of the public and key national services from attacks, **P**ursue terrorist and sponsors to obtain justice, **P**repare the nation to manage and minimize the consequences of terrorist attacks and **P**rogram implementation to include crime registering, border management, vehicle registration, de-radicalization and challenging the terrorists ideology. (NACTEST 2011). The author in [9] reported that Nigeria government has launched a new strategy 'Soft Approach' aimed at tackling insurgency in the North East Nigeria, it is very much at the early stage and the program is yet to take off. For the government to announce the 'Soft Approach' in March of 2014 after five years of countering the insurgency via military strategy further supports the researchers' position that there is a need to effectively explore alternative strategies than military force to curb terrorism, because the use of military force is inadequate. Some of the programs planned by the government under the strategic security plan include the following: the Safe School Initiative (SSI), the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), and Nigeria's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program. Under the *Safe Schools Initiative (SSI)*, government has both short and long term plans. The short term plan is to accelerate the enrolment of displaced children in schools in their host communities and secure places in schools for children in IDP camps, while the long term plan is to secure communities as soon as they are rid of the terrorists so that citizens can return safely and children go back to school in their community. However, if need be, children living in Local Government Areas at high risk of insurgent activities could be transferred to secondary schools in safer locations. Apart from the SSI program,

Almajiri schools that have been established by the government. According to President Jonathan:

... I met excited young children. These are bright, lively children, now receiving the best Nigeria can offer. With public funds, the next generation now has the tools it needs to make for themselves better lives and to make this a better country. I know very well what education means. Education is the key to transformation. My dream is that one day, a product of Almajiri schools will become President of this great nation [10].

Under the *Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE)*, government is addressing immediate human suffering by empowering response agencies to better deliver much needed humanitarian relief – food, non-food items, and medicines to victims of Boko Haram. The government also have inaugurated the North East Economic Transformation (NEET) which has embarked on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the North East so that the region could be rebuilt and experience economic renaissance. The nation will leverage the region's strategic agricultural and solid mineral assets to create jobs and expand economic opportunities for the youths, and ensure long-term peace and prosperity. While under the Nigeria's CVE program, government is focusing de-radicalization and reintegration of suspected and convicted extremist offenders back into the society which is been managed by the State Security Services (SSS). The program involves the development and implementation of an after care program for the de-radicalized involving community reintegration and rehabilitation. However, it is important to note that much of the non-military strategies are at the planning stage and actual implementation is at early stage.

6. Justification for Alternatives to Military Strategy

Counter-terrorism program in Nigeria has been more military than non-military in its intervention strategies, but there is a need to shift paradigm because it is not effective to a larger extent. The casualty level is very high, the impact in terms of ameliorating the situation is very little and citizens all over the world are calling for a change of approach. Scholars in [11,12] are proposing the expansion of the strategies to go beyond just military to include non-military components. But the most recent call came from two former US Presidents, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton in December 2012, who argued that the US 'war on Drug' in Mexico is not working because 60,000 Mexicans have been killed between 2008 and 2012 and still the US drug problems are not abated. They propose that the government of America go back to the drawing board because the US approaches are not effective.

In the same vein, this article is proposing that the Nigerian government go back to the drawing board to develop a strategy that goes beyond military even though the military attacks of the Multi National Joint Task Force led by President Buhari's administration had some positive impact with the reduction of terrorist attacks as claimed by the Defense Headquarters (DHQ) and the Minister for Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed. They argued that the attacks of Boko Haram since the present administration are sporadic and this is a sign that the group is losing the battle against government forces. But it is important to note that the military program led to human rights violations as recorded in Baga, Borno State where the government and civil society organizations are having conflicting figures in terms of casualties. Report in [13] of satellite images reveal massive destruction of civilian property from a military raid on April 16 and 17, 2013, in the northern Nigerian

town of Baga. According to the residents, soldiers ransacked the town after the Boko Haram militant Islamist group attacked a military patrol, killing a soldier. They said that immediately after the attack they counted 2,000 burned homes and 183 bodies. Not only is the call for paradigm shift relevant, it is timely.

Many analysts argue that defeating global terrorism requires addressing its root causes, such as economic deprivation, limitations on social and political rights, violations of the rule of law, unwanted military occupations, and extremism and intolerance resulting from insufficient education or public debate. There is a strong need to link both the root causes and the proximate causes to the intervention strategy that must be developed and used. If abject poverty, illiteracy, religious indoctrination and intolerance and many other socio-economic and political conditions are seen to be the causes of terrorism as identified by the UN, then, for countering the phenomenon, any intervention that can bring lasting solution to the problem must address those conditions. As regards the larger African continental setting, the evidence from research studies confirms the generalization that much of the terrorist phenomenon that goes by the name of religious fundamentalism including what is now associated with Boko Haram is but an articulation of socio-political conditions of misery, frustration, despair only masquerading under a religious garb [14]. In the specific Nigerian case, the far northern parts of the country, therefore, sole military intervention which includes combat, checking the hideouts of terrorists and the boots of cars, without looking at those conditions will not yield sustainable result. The episodic and reactive response adopted by the government at the aftermath of the attacks, have the potential of pushing terrorist cells underground and making the threat difficult to address in a more robust and sustainable manner. Instead of the State of Emergency declared in those states, the Federal Government of Nigeria should declare state of emergency on poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, youth unemployment and religious fundamentalism. Considering the fact that causes of terrorism are factors from socio-political, culture-religious and economic factors, it makes sense to expect intervention strategies that reflect these conditions. The arguments of the scholar in [14] in addressing the root causes of terrorism because until that is done, the government is merely addressing the symptoms is also significant. According to Adekanye, there is a relationship between rising poverty and rising conflict, so, any conscious effort to counter terrorism, must address the socio-economic fundamentals of the people. Therefore, sole military strategy is not enough and alternative non-military options must be explored.

7. Non-violent Alternative Strategies

De-radicalization

According to the IPI Conference Report, “De-radicalization,” refers to ‘the process of divorcing a person, voluntarily or otherwise, from their extreme views’, and it is gradually seen by many scholars as a new approach in counterterrorism strategy as states and civil society seek softer, often preventive, measures to deal with violent extremism [16]. These scholars believe that de-radicalization programs are more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists, because they are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism. This then, made the program grow popular and wider in scope as there are various approaches to it.

...these programs vary widely, with differing subjects (e.g., prisoners, potential terrorists, convicted criminals, repentant extremists), aims (e.g., abandonment of extreme views, disengagement from terrorism, rehabilitation into society), sizes (from just a handful of participants to hundreds), and forms (from arranging jobs, marriages, and new lives for participants, to merely educating them on nonviolent alternatives to their methods), common themes and problems can be discerned [16].

Participants at the IPI conference argued strongly that a sound de-radicalization program needs to learn from how individuals become radicalized, meaning the source – family, social ties and the internet. The internet is considered the most influencing agent of radicalization as seen with recent cases in the US (“Jihad Jane” and others) and prior to that with the July 2005 bombings in London. Terrorists are often radicalized “remotely,” sometimes through the Internet alone [16]. Therefore, in developing a de-radicalization program, the sources must be checked, including the internet. Individuals that are generally susceptible to radicalization have a combination of the following characteristics: trusting a person already involved with a radical group; being “spiritually hungry” and dedicated to their faith, but having limited knowledge of their religion; and being desperate, naïve, or simply in need of money. So, all those seeking to recruit such people try to cater for their needs and interests - social, financial, or psycho - logical needs. The radicalization process include isolation of the targeted individuals and “educating” them about the cause. In case they are too fearful to participate in violence, they may then be asked to do something seemingly innocuous, like renting a car or an apartment to help out the group. In order, to elicit continued participation, they may be told that “the security forces now know about you, and they may torture you.” This will make the targeted individual draw closer to the radical group for protection and participation. Scholars in this field of study have argued strongly for the development of a de-radicalization program which can address extremism of the youth. The authors in [19] explained the importance of the program, but quickly cautioned that it is not one size fits all, as it must be specific, and relevant to the cultural and environmental realities. This is in concert with the author in [20] who strongly supported the use of de-radicalization program and argued that it can be a very effective way of countering the spread of radical-violent ideology, views and activism. The quick caution about the availability of the right conditions (political will, a vibrant civil society, a robust developmental and political capacity within the State) for success to exist, is corroborated by the respondents in this study who identified challenges to the implementation of the program in Nigeria. According to the National Security Adviser (NSA), Colonel Dasuki Sambo (rtd), the Federal Government will commence the intake of over 5,000 Boko Haram terrorists on the 18th January 2015 into their custody on the de-radicalization program, aimed at changing their behavioral pattern. He made the announcement at a world news conference on Countering Violent Extremism and explained that de-radicalization program was part of the soft approach launched in 2014 as an effort to end terrorism. He disclosed that two prisons had been refurbished in Kuje, Abuja and Aguata, in Anambra, for the de-radicalization program. The NSA said that the program would be carried out in batches and that: “...it is a legacy we must create for the next generation, to ensure that they live in a society ruled by tolerance and free from violent Extremism” [21].

The fact that the National Security Adviser is already working on establishing the program shows that de-radicalization is a viable strategy in countering terrorism in Nigeria. The author in [22] argued that the structure of the program start with proper profiling of the terrorists and classifying them into moderate or extreme groups.

The experts who will 20, 2014 that he can pick out the faults in the message and be able to tell the differences. The people who can work on this program will include psychological experts, religious clerics, trauma therapists, guidance counselors, academic experts in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), security agents and vocational experts who can train the insurgents on relevant skills. However, two respondents, of those interviewed commented on the methodology that can be adopted for the program. These scholars argued that looking at Nigeria's counter terrorism policy, there are plans to de-radicalize individuals, but the implementation will be a huge challenge due to the following factors:

- **Overcoming Bias and Sentiments.** It has been noticed that not everyone involved with the counter terrorism program is fully convinced that it is so deadly anyway. There is this attitude of protection either because of religious affiliation or ethnic relationship. If an officer who is supposed to de-radicalize the individual does not see the reason for that because of personal reasons that could be a source of problem.
- **Guaranteeing the Protection of the De-radicalizing Officers.** The killing of Muslim clerics who are preaching against the sect like Mallam Abani in Zaria sent messages of fear to people who could challenge the message of the terrorists. So, efforts should be made to put a plan in place to secure clerics or professionals who will be working on the program as they will be considered threat by the sect.
- **Strict Selection Process of the Relevant Experts.** The challenge of selecting the right persons for the job must be taken care of. There is a tendency to recruit people who may not be qualified for the job because of pressures of unemployment and the desire to earn very highly. Also, because of the 'federal character' policy that require state and zonal representation into federal government ministries and agencies, many people who are not qualified to seek employment in the program could be employed, leaving out those who are qualified, thereby making the program unsuccessful.
- **Weakness of Relevant Institutions.** Reports from the prisons show congestions and dilapidations of the facilities which will make the re-habilitation difficult, if not impossible. So, for effective de-radicalization program to take place, specially built institutions that will house the program must be provided with relevant departments functioning properly.
- **Provision of Adequate Funding.** Even though there is the universal understanding that security sector is the most funded part of the economy because of its crucial importance to the nation, there are still reports of under-funding which must be addressed. Adequate funding must be provided for this program.

Negotiation/Peace Processes

Political Factors have been identified to be major causes of terrorism. Martin in [23] explaining the causes of terrorism looked at the role of political philosophies and theories of Karl Marx. Marx argued that what is needed is an act of political will which is an effort to force change. According to him, it is a choice, a rational decision from the revolutionary's perspective, to adopt specific tactics and methodologies to defeat an adversary. However, all that is required for final victory is the political and strategic will to achieve the final goal.

Therefore, selecting terrorism is a process based on the experiences of each insurgent group and thus the outcome of an evolutionary political progression, because terrorism is simply a tool, an option, selected by members of the political fringe to achieve a goal. To the revolutionaries, terrorism is a deliberate strategy, and success is ensured as long as the group's political and strategic will remains strong because the prediction of the eventual collapse of capitalism was based on scientific law. Another author in [24] in her study with a working group agreed on the central principle that terrorism is a form of political action that cannot be taken out of specific historical contexts or treated as a generic phenomenon, it is a strategy rooted in political discontent, used in the service of many different beliefs and doctrines that help legitimize and sustain violence. Naturally, ideologies associated with nationalism, revolution, religion, and defense of the status quo have all inspired terrorism. A related aspect of the political explanatory scheme appears in writings where the author in [25] advanced the arguments about terrorism being viewed as a problem of conflict, and with "its understanding amenable to the use of conflict analysis, and conflict diagnosis and its solution susceptible to application of the tools of conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution". Similarly, another author was of the opinion that governments could negotiate with terrorist groups, as it will help open up political channels for discussions, gather information, address root causes of the insurgency, and provide counter-narratives and long-term commitment vis-à-vis the terrorist organization [26]. The argument about not negotiating with terrorist organization is based on this perspective:

Democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talks can destabilize the negotiating governments' political systems, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent [27].

Even though some scholars see negotiating with terrorist groups as dangerous, some others believe that: ...negotiations with terrorist groups are a part of a holistic counter terrorism strategy used to encourage organizations to enter the political mainstream rather than turning to terrorism, and to induce rebels holding hostages or demanding ransom to release their victims. Many states may want to avoid negotiations, however, negotiations often become inevitable and have been accepted as a formal strategy even by nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, who have traditionally been averse to what is generally seen as surrender to the demands of violent rebels. (Negotiating with Terrorists: A Mediator's Guide [28]).

Finally Egbue and his colleagues in [29] are of the position that it is wrong to view negotiation, mediation, and dialogue with terrorist groups like Boko Haram as a sign of weakness or compromise. They further argued that refusing to talk with them (terrorists) and over reliance on military force are defective responses which has often escalated conflicts, after all terrorist activities are founded on real or imagined grievances, demands, or deprivations, and dialoguing with them will not only provides opportunity to fully understand the basis of the terrorism but also conveys a sense of achievement on the part of the terrorist group that they have successfully drawn attention of the state to their plight. Therefore, negotiation should not be completely ignored as an approach to resolving contending issues, although it is important to acknowledge the fact that it is not very easy as terrorist groups are not easily accessible.

Communities and Community Based Organizations (CBOs)

Communities and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) constitute an important part of sustenance. Grass root democracies and development agencies have been found to hold the secret of sustainability, and it will not be different in preventing or managing terrorism. Development agencies have always trusted the role of CBOs and CSOs and have worked with them to get things done, even, prevention of conflicts and peace building. Therefore, getting them to come on board for countering Boko Haram is acceptable.

According to Briggs in [30], community engagement in counterterrorism in UK since 2001 have thwarted many terrorists' attacks between 2001 and 2008, and over 200 individuals were successfully prosecuted for planning, supporting or inciting terrorism. She identified four ways in which well integrated communities can contribute towards an effective counterterrorism strategy - act as an early warning system for the police and intelligence services; prevent young people from becoming radicalized towards violence; tackle the grievances—real and perceived—that allow terrorists' messages to resonate more widely, either among those who might be swayed to commit, support or incite terrorism, or among those in whose name terrorists purport to act; And the principle of policing through consent is as relevant to counterterrorism as to any other area of law enforcement. So, is the case of the civilian JTF (the vigilante youth group) that is known to have recorded success in identifying and leaking information on the hideouts of the Boko Haram members to the soldiers. For example a reporter Odeleye of *Daily Times Nigeria* on the 14th June 2014 reported an incident:

The displaced Gwoza man was being driven in a commercial tricycle (Keke Napep) when he sighted the suspected killer of his brother who died during an attack on their community in Gwoza local government. He immediately jumped out of the Keke-Napep and held the suspect with whom he began to wrestle. We never knew what was happening until the man began to shout 'this is Boko Haram man that killed my brother in Gwoza, please come and help me catch him. He was the one that shot my brother.' That was how members of the civilian-JTF gathered and arrested the man whom they later handed over to soldiers nearby," said an eyewitness, who said his name should not be mentioned [31].

The activities of the Civilian JTF makes them the most hated group by the Boko Haram sect as was captured by Odeleye in [32]

When Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram releases his video messages these days, the people who have begun to attract more hate and bile than any other are the vigilante groups in the North that have mobilized themselves to defend their communities and fight Boko Haram. This group of people, mostly untrained and outnumbered have recorded some astounding victories against the sect even though some have lost their lives in the process.

According to the author in [33] when armed robbers attacked the Azare in Bauchi, killing 10 people and seriously injured 8 others, both the Police and Army were assisted by the community youths who were able to overpower the robbers and killed them. It is a known fact the words of encouragement and support from the leaders made hundreds of the youths of the community to pursue the terrorists, rounded them up, disarmed them

and killed them. With this development, the community and CSOs are working together with the police to make their communities unsafe for Boko Haram operations and there is hardly any news of terrorist attacks in the state. This paper is of the view that there should be strong involvement of the communities in the counterterrorism program. They argued that the members of the Boko Haram sect are known members of the community and if the community rise up to the challenge like the people of Azare community in Bauchi, the insurgency will stop.

Scholars in [34], [35] and [36] have argued strongly for the government security operatives and the community organizations and leaderships to work together for sustainable peace. It will be dangerously misleading not to include the CSOs and the community members in the development of the security structures that can counter Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

These findings have shown that communities' participation in securing their communities from violent conflicts or insecurities is mandatory if sustainable peace would be achieved. This study has contributed to the discussion of community and CSOs contribution to managing the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Improved Socio-Economic Conditions

The fourth alternative program is premised on the proposition that the government needs to go beyond military force as strategy for countering terrorism in Nigeria. This implies that, there is need to look beyond military approaches and investigate the fundamental causes of terrorism. Poverty due to unemployment caused by poor economic conditions following wrong policies, corruption, and weak institutional structures are some of the identified root causes in this study.

The socio-economic explanations for conflict were better captured by the Structural Theory of Conflict and the Relative Deprivation Theory of conflict originating from Karl Marx, Friederich Engels, and V.I. Lenin thesis on historical materialism which argued that conflict is hinged on the economic structures and social institutions of any state and that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organized. The theory attempts to explain conflict as product of the tension that arises when groups must compete for scarce resources. Theorists of structural conflict built their theories on their observations of societies in which conflict occurred among groups, and that groups have structures which define them. For example, Karl Marx sees rigidly structured economies that had to be overthrown forcefully for the sake of fairer, yet differently structured societies, while Max Weber believes that structures had to evolve peacefully to retain their legitimacy, or conflict would result. Radical structural theorists like Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao Tse-Tsung, in their different theses blame capitalism for being an exploitative system (the domination of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie). For resolution, conflicts can only be resolved through a revolution where the bourgeois class will be overthrown.

According to Field in [37], structural theory is useful in that it provides a stark, clear explanation for conflict between groups which is always welcome when trying to make sense of chaotic events. It also provides a plausible explanation for a large agglomeration of social, economic and political vectors that influence groups

that eventually collide in conflict, therefore, making structural conflict a good place to start more finely detailed studies of conflict.

The theory looks at social problems like political and economic exclusion, injustice, poverty, disease, exploitation, inequity and other vices as the root causes of conflict. Furthermore, it believes that conflicts occur because of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies and the domination of one class by another. Another scholar that has applied this theory in his analysis of causes of conflict is Adekanye in his *Selected Essays* that looked at terrorism in Africa. According to the author in [38], economic poverty due to unhealthy government economic policies, corruption and the undemocratic political structures are the causes of conflict. He strongly argued that if the socio-economic conditions are poor, conflict will be on the rise. Rising poverty, rising conflict is one of his strongest analogy.

Other scholars, like Andre Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, as well as Emmanuel Wallesterstein who are Marxists and underdevelopment theorists also used the structural theory to explain the reasons for development and underdevelopment; and why Third World Countries are not developing. They argued that the world capitalist systems have been exploitative and retarding the development of Third World Countries. According to them, material interest in a society is skewed *abinitio* in favor of a group to the detriment of another reinforced by political and institutional factors; as well as ethnic factors, therefore, conflict becomes inevitable. Scholars in [39,18,17] all strongly believe that poor socio-economic conditions play big role in the activities of terrorists and improving on it will be very helpful.

Records have it that there are specific socioeconomic frustrations found predominantly in northern Nigeria. Poverty, unemployment, and lack of education are much higher here than in the rest of the country. A recent report by the National Population Commission found that literacy rates are much lower among states in the North, and that 72 percent of children around the ages of 6-16 never attended schools in Borno state, where Boko Haram was founded [15].

As the author in [8] notes:

...a new form of neo-liberal market economy was ushered in that privatized the state and resulted in university educated graduates struggling to find employment. Employment became a matter of a patron-client relationship, coupled with access to state power.

To the author in [7] the deregulation of the nation's economy also set the stage for the sharp decline in farming in the north, as the government disposed of all land and programs they had maintained to support agricultural activities in the area. Climate change and the country's increasing dependence on oil revenues also shaped the fortunes of the agricultural sector in the North [6].

The author in [3] noted that socioeconomic changes combined to produce a sense of insecurity and vulnerability among northern Nigerians, and particularly among Muslim communities. This, in turn, offers insights into why Boko Haram's ideology has resonated among many, including frustrated university graduates who find legitimacy in their argument that Western society has failed them; their aspirations cannot be met by the system

currently in place.

Many scholars, just to mention a few have argued that there is a strong need to address the poor socio-economic conditions in northern Nigeria as they have shown the relationship between poverty and conflict and rising poverty and rising conflict.

8. Conclusion

De-radicalization of the members of the Boko Haram sect is a required program that is non-violent hence a tremendous help to Nigerian society and those radicalized by the sect. It must be so structured in a way that the right people (experts) are part of the program and the government must support it. Also, peace processes must be initiated because it works as terrorism is viewed as violent conflict. Although it is generally difficult to engage in peace processes with terrorist organization. Also, the incorporating all Nigerians not just community members affected by the sect and all non-governmental organizations in the fight against terrorism. Finally, improving the socio-economic conditions of the people and good governance are a must if the government is serious about curb terrorism in Nigeria. Military approach to internal security is frivolous.

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