Nonviolent Approach: Alternative to Military Strategy for Curbing Terrorism in Nigeria
Keywords:
deprivation, Boko, Haram, Just war, Islamization, Terrorism.Abstract
Factors such as poor governance, fierce passion for the Islamisation of Nigeria and other grievances that are difficult to resolve through political process breed terrorism. Government should first correct the known ills in her governance. Government’s first attempt on curbing terrorism was the use of force, which is so defective. The just war theory, stipulate that, military action shouldn’t cause terror and dead of civilians, which the army is seriously accused of. The first wrong step by the government agency was the extra judicial killing of Boko Haram leader, which exacerbate the violence and increase sympathizers to the sect advantage. The first step should have been intelligence gathering and study how to defeat the sect if not, then, a holistic approach that encapsulates all the actors (Government, the citizens and the NGOs) not a selected few in the fight against terrorism. The paper used qualitative methodology and the method of data collection were from semi-structured interviews, books, media and internets sources. The theory used is “Just War Theory”. The evidence presented in this paper is that some of the many stakeholders are not active in the fight against terrorism. A consistent, nonviolent approach and good governance could have controlled the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. However, a concerted de-radicalization program that forestall the possibility of recruitment and the process of de-radicalizing those radicalized is nonviolent approach.
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http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105611:blair-others-unveil-peace-deal-for-nigeria-&catid=1:national&Itemid=559
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[3] 2
[4] AIT, Big Story 15th May 2013.
[5] N. G. Egbue; I. U. Nwankwo, & B. O. Alichie. (2015) “Curbing Boko Haram Terrorist Insurgence in Nigeria: Imperatives of Quadruple Action Package of Limited Military Response, Improved Social Services, Conflict Resolution Initiatives and Modified Pacifism” British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences. ISSN: 2046-9578. 20(I). Available: http://www.bjournal.co.uk/BJASS.aspx
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[11] T. O’Connor, T. (2012). “Counterterrorism: Military and Economic Options.” MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. [online] available from http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3400/3400lect08a.htm. [16 May 2013]
[12] M. R. Haberfeld, & A. von Hassell. (2009). Proper Proactive Training to Terrorist Presence and Operations in Friendly Urban Environments. Springer US, 2009, pp 9-22.
[13] The Human Rights Watch. Internet: www.humanrightswatch.org, Oct. 2013, [Dec. 10, 2014
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[19] L. Dugan, & E. Chenoweth. (2012) “Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel.” American Psychological Review [on-line]. 77(4) pp 597. Available: http://asr.sagepub.com/content/77/4/597
[20] R. Gunaratna. “The Global Landscape of Terrorism.” Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism research. 4 (1) 2012.
[21] “Boko Haram: Nigeria rolls-out Soft Approach to Counter Terrorism” Premium Times (Mar. 20, 2014), security, PP 3. Available: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/157111-boko-haram-nigeria-rolls-soft-approach-counter-terrorism.html [10 [Nov. 2016]
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[23] G. Martin. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, 2nd ed. California: Sage Publications, 2013.
[24] M. Crenshaw. (2005). “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: Political Explanations’. Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism Madrid: Club de Madrid. [on-line]. Available: www.clubdemadrid.org
[25] J. B. Adekanye. “Terrorism and Globalization: How Should the International Community Respond? An African Perspective” Linking Conflict Diagnosis, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Management in Contemporary Africa: Selected Essays, Ibadan: Ababa Press, 2007.
[26] T. Van Dongen (2009) “Break it Down: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism.” Economics of Security Working Paper 23, Berlin: Economics of Security [on-line]. Available: www.economicsofsecurity.org
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[28] “Negotiating with Terrorists: A Mediator’s Guide.” IIASA Policy Brief. March 2009. http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN/docs/pb06-web.pdf [May. 20, 2015]
[29] N. G. Egbue; I. U. Nwankwo, & B. O. Alichie. (2015) “Curbing Boko Haram Terrorist Insurgence in Nigeria: Imperatives of Quadruple Action Package of Limited Military Response, Improved Social Services, Conflict Resolution Initiatives and Modified Pacifism” British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences. ISSN: 2046-9578. 20(I). Available: http://www.bjournal.co.uk/BJASS.aspx
[30] Briggs (2010) “Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00923.x/abstract [Nov. 9th, 2016]
[31] Odeleye. “Boko Haram Killer Squad Members Arrested In Maiduguri” Daily Times Nigeria (June 2014), Security, 1. Available: www.dailytimesnigeria.com
[32] 31
[33] P. Orude. “Bauchi: Death toll in Azare attack now ten”. National Newspapers (2012)
[34] James J. F. Forest (2012), Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria JSOU Report 12-5 The JSOU Press MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
[35] Fisher, J. “Are Nigeria’s Boko Haram getting foreign backing?” [online]. Available http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13843967. (June, 2011)
[36] D. Benjamin. Strategic Counterterrorism. Brookings Institution, 2008.
[37] A. J. Field. Why Multilevel Selection Matters. Jena: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, 2004, pp 5
[38] J. B. Adekanye. “Terrorism and Globalization: How Should the International Community Respond? An African Perspective” Linking Conflict Diagnosis, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Management in
[39] S. E. Barkan and L. L. Snowden. Collective violence. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 2001, pp 7
[40] M. Radu. “The Futile Search for “Root Causes” of Terrorism.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002, Pp 23.
[41] S. B. Blomberg, G.D. Hess and A. Weerapana (2004) “Economic Conditions and Terrorism.” European Journal of Political Economy. [on-line] 20(2), pp. 463-478. Available: www.europeanjournalofpoliticaleconomy.org [Oct. 2012]
[42] ‘Foreign direct investment: Just how ready is Nigeria’ Vanguard (July, 2011) Business unit [on-line]. Available: www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/foreign-direct-investment-how-ready-is-nigeria/
[43] U. Isa “Boko Haram: How It All Began” Daily Trust (Aug., 2010) Security Unit [on-line] Available: http://sundaytrust.com.ngindex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85:=110 [Jul. 2013]
[44] Z. A. Bonat, “Economic Deregulation, the Peasantry and agricultural In Nigeria: Kaduna State Case Study.” in The political Economy of Nigeria under Military rule: 1984-1993, Said A. Adejumobi (ed) et al, Harare: Sapes, 1995.
[45] U. Isa “Boko Haram: How It All Began” Daily Trust (Aug., 2010) Security Unit [on-line] Available: http://sundaytrust.com.ngindex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85:=110 [Jul. 2013]
[46] James J. F. Forest (2012), Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria JSOU Report 12-5 The JSOU Press MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
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Published
2016-11-20
How to Cite
Mbagwu, J., & Mavalla, A. G. (2016). Nonviolent Approach: Alternative to Military Strategy for Curbing Terrorism in Nigeria. American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences, 26(3), 124–139. Retrieved from https://asrjetsjournal.org/index.php/American_Scientific_Journal/article/view/2282
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